




   
n. 
10/2011 
Do Monetary Incentives and 
Chained Questions Affect the 
Validity of Risk Estimates 
Elicited via the 
Exchangeability Method? An 
Experimental Investigation 
Simone Cerroni, Sandra Notaro, W. Douglass Shaw  Do Monetary Incentives and Chained Questions Affect the 
Validity of Risk Estimates Elicited via the Exchangeability 
Method? An Experimental Investigation 
Simone Cerroni
*     Sandra Notaro
†    W. Douglass Shaw
‡§
November 15, 2011 
Abstract 
Using  a  laboratory  experiment,  we  investigate  the  validity  of  stated  risks  elicited  via  the 
Exchangeability  Method  (EM)  by  defining  a  valuation  method  based  on  de  Finetti’s  notion  of 
coherence. The reliability of risk estimates elicited through the EM has been theoretically questioned 
because the chained structure of the game, in which each question depends on the respondent’s answer 
to the previous one, is thought to potentially undermine the incentive compatibility of the elicitation 
mechanism even when real monetary incentives are provided. Our results suggest that superiority of 
real monetary incentives is not evident when people are presented with chained experimental design.  
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1  Introduction 
During  the  last  decade,  many  social  scientists  have  become  more  interested  in 
investigating  perceptions  of  risks,  and  eliciting  subjective  estimates  of  probabilities.  The 
reason is that people often behave and make decisions according to their beliefs and these do 
not always coincide with science-based estimates of risks
1. Failure to recognize the existence 
of divergent subjective risks may create quite a puzzling interpretation of responses to the 
science-based risks. 
There  are  many  different  ways  in  which  to  elicit  subjective  risks,  and  several  are 
briefly discussed below. In this paper, we use an innovative risk elicitation technique known 
as  the  Exchangeability  Method  (EM),  focusing  on  issues  related  to  implementing  it  in  a 
credible manner. Our application is to elicit consumers’ perceptions of the probability that 
given  levels  of  pesticide  residues  will  be  present  in  apples  produced  in  the  future  in  the 
Province of Trento (Italy). The study is conducted using subjects in laboratory experiments. 
Pesticide residues pose health risks to people who eat apples, and thus people’s perceptions of 
their presence can affect consumers’ purchasing behaviors. The investigation of this issue is 
quite  important  to  this  region  in  Italy  because  the  saleable  gross  production  of  apple 
production is approximately 23% of the entire agricultural saleable gross production in that 
Province (P.A.T., 2007). 
The  reliability  of  stated  risks  estimates  elicited  via  the  EM  has  been  questioned 
because the chained structure of the experimental design is thought to potentially undermine 
the  incentive  compatibility  of  the  elicitation  mechanism.  An  elicitation  mechanism  is 
incentive compatible if subjects have an incentive to state their real preferences (Vossler and 
Evans, 2009). Previous studies have overcome this issue, however, by presenting people with 
particular experimental designs that partially hide the chained structure of the game (Baillon, 
2008; Abdellaoui et al., 2011). However, to our knowledge, no study has ever tested the effect 
of  chained  questions  on  the  validity  of  stated  risk  estimates  elicited  via  Exchangeability 
Method.  
                                                          
1 A very timely example of the crucial effect of perceived risks on people’s behaviors is represented by the 
proposal of the Italian Government to postpone the referendum (June 12nd-13rd 2011) on the installation of 
nuclear plants in Italy. This postponement was proposed because the recent events in Fukushima (Japan) might 
have strongly influenced citizens’ perceived risks of nuclear disasters and, thus, influenced their desire to have or 
not have nuclear plants in Italy. 2
Our laboratory experiment uses a method for determining and measuring the validity 
of stated risk estimates elicited via the EM. This method is based on de Finetti’s notion of 
coherence and allows us to test the validity of stated risks at both the sample and individual 
levels.  By  using  this  validation  method  we  also  aim  to  exam  the  potential  effect  of  real 
monetary  incentives  and  chained  questions  on  stated  risk  estimates  elicited  via  EM.  In 
particular, we study whether these factors affect the validity of stated risks or not
2.  
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  laid  out  as  follows.  In  the  next  sections,  we  first 
highlight the main strengths and limitations of the EM by comparing it to other risk elicitation 
techniques. Then, we more formally define the notion of validity and describe our testable 
hypotheses. Finally, we offer some conclusions based on the experimental results we have 
obtained. 
2  Chained experimental designs and monetary incentives 
The simplest way to elicit risks
3 consists of asking people to directly state either the 
chance that a specific magnitude of the outcome will happen in the future or, the other way 
round,  the  specific  magnitude of  the  outcome  that  will  happen  with  a  certain  probability 
(Spetzler and Von Holstein 1975). Asking simple stated risk questions is common in health 
risk  studies,  such  as  those  involving  smoking  cigarettes  (e.g.  Viscusi  1990)  or  drinking 
contaminated water (e.g. Shaw et al. forthcoming). However, the reliability of risk estimates 
elicited  via  this  family  of  techniques,  called  direct  methods,  have  been  often  questioned 
because laypeople are usually not familiar with the notion of probability (e.g., Jakus et al. 
2009;  Riddel  and  Shaw  2006  for  health  or  mortality  risks;  and  Baker  et  al.  2009  for 
environmental risks).  
Other studies overcome the limitations of direct methods by eliciting risk measures via 
indirect methods, for example, from respondents’ choices over lotteries and for gambles or 
bets. In this case, probability measures are indirectly estimated at the points for which people 
                                                          
2 Since this experiment is conducted in the lab, with a controlled environment and real monetary incentives, we 
only refer to the internal validity of elicited risk estimates. Hence, we cannot analyze the external validity of our 
results, being aware that elicited estimates in the lab might be different from those elicited in the field, where it is 
impossible to control for many confounding factors (for instance, background risk) (Harrison et al., 2007).   
3 In this paper we define risk as the probability that given outcomes occur (or that given severities of an outcome 
occur).  3
show their indifference between lotteries or gambles. These indirect techniques have been 
mostly used for financial risks, (e.g., Andersen et al. 2009; Offerman et al. 2009), but recently 
scholars have considered them in the estimation of health and environmental risks (e.g., Fiore 
et al. 2009; Cerroni and Shaw 2011 for environmental risks)
4. 
The most popular of the indirect methods are the so-called “external reference events” 
in which people are asked to choose between a lottery characterized by an uncertain event (U) 
whose probability needs to be estimated and a lottery characterized by an external reference 
event (K) whose probability is known and is disclosed to respondents. The probability of the 
known event (K) is often visually presented through probability wheels, scroll bars or other 
visual aids such as risk ladders, grids, or pie charts, all of which have been tested as risk 
communication  devices  (e.g.,  Morgan  and  Henrion  1990).  Once  respondents  become 
indifferent between the two lotteries, this means that they attach to the uncertain outcome (U) 
the same probability with which the familiar outcome (K) will happen, so that P(U) = P(K) 
(Spetzler and Von Holstein 1975). Although these techniques are widely used, they have a 
crucial drawback, related to the notion of source dependence. Some experimental studies have 
recently shown that individual choices depend on the source of uncertainty that respondents 
have  been  asked  to  consider  (Kilka  and  Weber  2001;  Abdellaoui  et  al.  2011)
5.  When 
individuals have to process more than one source of uncertainty at the same time, the choices 
becomes too complex and their risk estimates might be biased. This is likely to occur in most 
external-reference-events  approaches,  i.e.,  those  in  which  subjects  have  to  deal  with 
uncertainties related to both outcomes and probabilities represented through external devices. 
The source dependence problem does not appear in another class of indirect methods, 
which use internal events. In these, subjects deal with magnitudes of the outcomes, but not 
with probabilities of the outcomes. In fact, subjects or survey respondents are only asked to 
bet a certain amount of money on one of the several disjoint subspaces in which the whole 
state  space  of  the  variable  under  study  has  been  previously  divided.  When  respondents 
become indifferent to bet on one disjoint subspace rather than on the others, they are assumed 
to perceive those subspaces as equally likely (Spetzler and Von Holstein 1975). The EM that 
                                                          
4 The limited use of these indirect methods for eliciting health and environmental risks is due to the fact that 
health outcomes and very long term environmental outcomes cannot be played out at the end of experiments in 
the lab setting, thus making incentive compatibility again an issue. 
5 Baillon (2008, p. 77) defined a source of uncertainty as “…a set of events that are generated by a common 4
was formally described by Raiffa (1968) and more recently implemented by Baillon (2008) 
and Abdellaoui et al. (2011) belongs to this class of risk elicitation techniques. 
As noted above, the EM unfortunately is criticized for potential failure to be incentive 
compatible, even when chained question structures are used with real monetary incentives. 
Questions are defined as chained when one question is constructed depending on respondents’ 
answers to the previous one. For instance, because of sub-dividing event spaces, the two sub-
events that respondents face in one question of an EM task depend on respondents’ choices 
during the previous question. In their empirical application of EM, Abdellaoui et al. (2011) 
pointed out that: 
“…one may be concerned about it being advantageous for subjects not to 
answer according to their true preferences in a question but instead to seek to 
improve the stimuli that will occur in future questions” (p. 44). 
Previous investigations that develop games with chained structures and real monetary 
incentives, have taken this issue very seriously. For instance, some of them have validated 
their results by using respondents’ statements of unawareness about the presence of chained 
questions in the game (Van de Kuilen et al. 1981; Abdellaoui et al. 2011). In his own recent 
application  of  the  Exchangeability  Method,  Baillon  (2008)  dealt  with  this  problem  by 
randomizing  or  resorting  the  order  of  questions  and  making  the  chaining  unclear  to 
respondents,  such  that  they  are  no  longer  aware  of  the  relationship  between  the  disjoint 
subspaces they face in one question with those of the previous question.  
It is clear however, that in all previous studies that utilize chained games in presence 
of real monetary incentives, the authors have tried to avoid the use of identifiable chained 
questions in their experimental designs, but have not investigated their presumed potential 
negative effect on subject’s choice-behaviours. Hence, our study also empirically tests the 
presence of a potential “chaining effect” by comparing the validity of stated risk estimates 
elicited via EM with and without chained questions.
Baillon (2008), states that telling the truth is the simplest and most efficient strategy 
respondents can use when they play the games that constitute the EM tasks. This means that 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
mechanism of uncertainty”. 5
subjects  would  not  respond  differently  to  tasks  whether  real  monetary  incentives  were 
provided or not, because they are already consistent with incentive compatibility. In fact, in 
their recent application of Exchangeability Game, Abdellaoui et al. (2011) have tested the 
effect of real monetary incentives on people’s choice-behaviours by comparing stated risk 
estimates given by two groups of respondents, one provided with monetary incentives and the 
other not. They concluded that the former group provides less noisy risk estimates than the 
latter group. However, given that their analysis uses a between–subjects investigation, the 
slight  difference  or  discrepancy  in  their  results  may  be  due  to  different  compositions  of 
samples.  
Below, we describe a method to definitively test possible superiority of stated risk 
estimates elicited via EM when people are rewarded with unchained questions. As we explain 
below,  our validation  method  is based on  the  de  Finetti’s  notions  of  exchangeability  and 
coherence. 
3  The notions of valid risk estimates and validity rate 
Taking inspiration from the de Finetti’s notion of coherent probability measures (de 
Finetti 1937; 1974a; 1974b)
6, we consider risk measures elicited via EM as valid if and only if 
they  obey  to  all  axioms  and  theorems  of  probability  theory
7.  As  noted  above,  we  also 
construct a sample validity rate which is the percentage of respondents providing valid risk 
estimates in the sample. 
The choice of using the de Finetti’s notion of coherence to define valid risk measures 
relies  on  the  fact  that  the  EM  is  based  on  the  assumption  of  exchangeability-based 
probabilistic sophistication (Chew and Sagi 2006), that in turn is based on the idea of equal 
likelihoods of exchangeable events (de Finetti 1937)
8. 
                                                          
6 de Finetti (1937) stated that “…a complete class of incompatible events E1, E2,..., En being given, all the 
assignments of probability that attribute to p1, p2 ,..., pn any values whatever, which are non-negative and have a 
sum equal to unity, are admissible assignment: each of these evaluations corresponds to a coherent opinion, (…), 
and every individual is free to adopt that one of these opinions (...) which he feels”. 
7  de  Finetti’s  (1937, 1974)  definition  of  “coherence” is  related to  the  notion of  probability.  We  extend  his 
definition to the notion of risk because we define risk as the probability that a given event occurs. 
8 Exchangeability implies that the probability that each event belonging to the set occurs is the same, without 
depending on the order of the events, but only on the number n of events. Hence, even the joint probability of all 
events belonging to a set of n events is always the same and does not depend on the order of the events (de 
Finetti 1937). 6
Chew and Sagi defined two events as comparable, under a probabilistic point of view, 
only when a sub-event of one is exchangeable with the other event. This way of comparison is 
intuitively straightforward considering that a sub-event is logically less likely than the event in 
which  it  is  contained.  In  other  words,  for  probabilistically  sophisticated  subjects  playing 
exchangeability games, two disjoint sub-events are exchangeable, and thus they have the same 
probability of occurrence, when they are indifferent to betting on one sub-event rather than on 
the other one.  
4  Predictions  
We first hypothesize that the provision of real monetary incentives to respondents do 
not have additional beneficial effects on the validity of stated risk estimates because telling the 
truth  is  the  simplest  and  most  efficient  strategy  respondents  can  use  when  they  play  the 
Exchangeability Game (EG) (Baillon 2008).  
Providing real monetary incentives and in contrast, not providing such real incentives, 
we  want  to  test  whether  the  use  of  chained  questions  per  se,  affects  the  validity  of  risk 
estimates.  We hypothesize that chained experimental designs have negative effects on the 
validity of stated risk estimates because they not only undermine the incentive compatibility 
of the game (Baillon 2008), but also generate meaningless questions where subjects are asked 
to choose between two prospects that they have already ruled out in previous questions. This 
may happen when subjects play the part of the game related to the elicitation of the second 
quartile. 
5  The Experimental Design 
5.1  The empirical application 
Our specific application consists of investigating stated risks related to fire blight, a 
bacterial disease that has threatened apple orchards in the Province of Trento, at least since 
2003  (IASMA  2006).  This  phytopathology  damages  and  kills  apple  plants  resulting  in 
substantial losses in the production of apples. The best available science predicts a future 
spread  of  the  disease  in  apple orchards  of  the  Province  of  Trento  since  suitable  climatic 7
conditions for the biology of the bacterium Erwinia Amylovora are likely to occur in the future 
(Edmund Mach Foundation).  
Italian farmers currently control the fire blight and the negative consequences that this 
has  on  apple  production  by  using  some  preventative  measures  which  consist  in  spraying 
pesticides based on copper compounds or Acibenzolar-S-metile on orchards. Unfortunately, 
these measures might be not efficient enough to prevent the future spread of fire blight and 
consequent  reductions  in  the  production  of  apples.  Nevertheless,  the  future  production  of 
apples in the Province of Trento (around 420.000 tons at the present time) might not decrease 
if farmers start implementing new adaptation strategies against fire blight. The only strategy 
that is easily available from a technical point of view to farmers is the introduction of new 
active principles for preventative and curative control of fire blight such as the antibiotic 
streptomycin that is currently forbidden by the Italian legislation, but that has been already 
used in  U.S., Germany,  Belgium and  Netherlands  for  controlling the fire  blight  (Németh, 
2004). 
In  the  context  presented  here,  we  focus  on  three  diverse  random  variables:  the 
percentage (or number) of days in which the infestation will occur during the blossoming 
period in 2030 (g)
9, the number of apples containing at least one residue in a sample of 100 
apples in 2030 (a)
10, and the number of apples containing more than one residue in a sample 
of 100 apples in 2030 (r)
11. These variables have been selected among many other possible 
measures of pest infestation, or apple contamination, after having interviewed approximately 
20 focus group subjects.
5.2  The sample 
The  sample  of  laboratory  subjects  consists  of  80  individuals  who  were  randomly 
recruited outside the main supermarkets of Trento and asked to come in the experimental lab 
of the University of Trento for a compensation of 25€ (show-up fee). Given the fact that we 
recruit  non-students  and,  then,  we  bring  them  in  the  lab,  we  can  define  our  study  as  an 
artefactual field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004). Our sample consists of people between 
                                                          
9 The blossoming period usually occurs in April in Trentino. 
10 The apple containing residues are those containing at least one residue beyond the level of 0 mg/kg. 
11 The apple containing residues are those containing at least two residues beyond the level of 0 mg/kg.8
18 and 70 years age who live in the Province of Trento and the sample is balanced regarding 
the gender. They are not, strictly speaking, a simple random sample of the population, because 
they were recruited outside food markets, but as most people visit such markets to obtain food, 
they  probably  are  quite  representative  of  people  leaving  in  this  Province.  Moreover,  the 
random  nature  of  the  sample  may  be  biased by  subjects’  motivation  to  participate  in  the 
experiment. For example, subjects may participate because they were interested in the topic or 
because they were in need of the show-up fee. Selected participants were randomly assigned 
to four subsamples or treatment groups, where each treatment is characterized by a different 
experimental  design:  “real  incentives-unchained  questions”  (22  subjects),  “real  incentives-
chained questions” (23 subjects), “hypothetical incentives-unchained questions” (19 subjects), 
and “hypothetical incentives-chained questions” (16 subjects). Next, the specific EM games or 
tasks are described. 
5.3  The Exchangeability Method and the related game 
Let a random variable under study in the EM game be g. The EM game uses a series of 
binary questions to reveal an individual’s underlying cumulative distribution function (CDF) 
over  an  event  x  that  is  drawn  from  an  event  space,  SG  =
1
1 G .  The  first  step  of  the  EM 
establishes the lower and upper bounds of the event space, defined as g0 and g1. Each subject 
is asked the bounds for outcomes outside of which they are essentially certain the outcome 
cannot happen at all ￿ i.e., the bounds that pertain to a non-zero probability of an outcome. 
These might be individual-specific, reflecting heterogeneity that allows formation of a set of 
possibilities a subject believes are feasible. 
The second step of the EM involves asking a series of questions that establish the 
value of g1/2∈SG that corresponds with the 50
th percentile of the subjective CDF, in other 
words, the median estimate. This series of questions asks the subject to choose between binary 
prospects. In the first binary question, SG is divided at a point ga into two prospects, say 
Ga={g0<x<ga} and  Ga’={ga≤x<g1},  where ga={g0  +  [(g1-g0)/2]}.  If  Ga  was chosen by  the 
individual, the implication is that the individual believes the probability of occurrence of the 
sub-event Ga is equal to that of the sub-event Ga’, so that P(Ga)≥P(Ga’) and ga≥g1/2. A follow-
up binary question is then asked of this same individual, using a new value gb and two new 9
prospects Gb and Gb’. If Ga was chosen in the first question, then ga<gb. However, if Ga’ was 
chosen in the first question, then ga>gb. This process is repeated until the individual reaches a 
value gz such that she/he is indifferent between Gz and Gz’. When this point is reached, it 
follows  that  gz=g1/2,  Gz=
1
2 G ,  Gz’=
2
2 G ,  and  P(Gz)=P(Gz’).  This  process  describes  the 
“chaining” or interdependence of these binary outcome questions. 
A  similar  process  can  be  followed  to  determine  other  points  for  the  individual’s 
subjective CDF; in theory as many as the researcher wants to identify. However, there is a 
limit  to how  many  separate  points  can be  elicited  because  of  potential  exhaustion  of  the 
subject.  For  example,  to  determine  the  value  of  g1/4∈SG  that  corresponds  with  the  25
th
percentile, a gamble is proposed that is contingent on a value of x that is lower than g1/2, 
obtained in the previous step. Once again, a sequence of values, ga, gb, …, gz is used, but in 
this next case (the quartile) the initial upper bound is g1/2. In the first new binary question, 
subjects choose between the following binary prospects, Ga={g0<x<gA}and Ga’={k1≤x<g1/2}. 
As above, this process is repeated until the individual is indifferent between Gz and Gz’, so that 
gz=g1/4 Gz=
1
4 G , Gz’=
2
4 G , and P(Gz)=P(Gz’) (see Figure 1 and Appendix A). At the end of the 
Exchangeability Game, the second binary question that respondents have already answered is 
presented again to them in order to test the consistency of their choice behaviours. 
5.4  Other games 
The Repeated Exchangeability Game (REG) consists in eliciting a new measure of the 
median value of individual CDFs, say g1/2’, through a second round of Exchangeability Game. 
This round differs from the first one because the lower and upper bounds of the event space 
are now not defined by g0 and g1, but instead by the subjective estimates of the quartiles g1/4
and g3/4 elicited via the EG (see Example 2 in Appendix A).  
The Certainty Equivalent Game (CEG) is based on the notion of certainty equivalents 
(CE) defined as the sure amount of money that makes people indifferent to gamble. For the 
CEG the subjects are presented with two choice tasks, say CT1 and CT2, both containing six 
binary questions. In each question of the first choice task (CT1), the subject is asked to choose 
between a lottery, in which he or she wins a monetary outcome x if the real outcome 
i
j G  will 
happen in the future (or a null monetary outcome otherwise), and a sure payment z, varying 10
from 0 to 100€. In the same way, in the CT2, the respondent is asked to choose between a 
lottery, in which she/he wins a monetary outcome x if the real outcome 
k
j G  will happen in the 
future (or a null monetary outcome otherwise), and a sure payment z varying from 0 to 100€. 
Hence, each subject is presented with two choice tasks characterized by six binary matching 
questions where he or she has to choose between options A (bet x € on the occurrence of 
i
j G
in CT1 or 
k
j G  in CT2) and B (take the amount of money z = 0, 25, 49, 51, 75, and 100€) (see 
Example 3 in Appendix A). The certainty equivalent for the lottery described in option A is 
determined by looking at the first question of the choice task in which the subject switches 
from choosing option A to choose option B. Recall that 
i
j G  and 
k
j G  are the couple of sub-
spaces that have been already judged to be equally likely by the subjects themselves, during 
the earlier EM game. Each subject in our study was presented with this game three times for 
each variable of interest in the study. In the first, the two lotteries involved in the game are 
denoted as 
1
2 G and 
2
2 G , in the second, they are 
1
4 G and 
2
4 G , and in the third, they are 
3




5.5  Treatments 
Recall from above that the validity of risk estimates are investigated by implementing 
four experimental treatments: the real monetary incentives-chained questions (TRC), the real 
monetary  incentives-unchained  questions  (TRU),  the  hypothetical  monetary  incentives-
chained  questions  (THC),  and  the  hypothetical  monetary  incentives-unchained  questions 
(THU).  
Hereafter  R  refers  to  real  monetary,  H  to  hypothetical,  C  to  chained,  and  U  to 
unchained.  For  the  H  treatments,  subjects  are  only  given  a  show-up  fee,  while  in  the  R 
treatments, subjects are told that one randomly selected individual from each group has the 
chance to win additional 100€ based on her/his choices during the experiment. Specifically, 
one subject is to be randomly selected at the end of the experiment and one of the questions 
she/he answers during the experiment is also randomly selected to be played out. The lucky 
                                                          
12 Both games have been already used to test exchangeability in other experimental applications (e.g., Baillon, 
2008; Abdellaoui et al., 2010). 11
subject is selected through the draw of a numbered chip from a bingo cage (Cage 1). The total 
number of chips is equal to the total number of participants in each session, so that each 
subject has an equal chance of being selected. The question with the potential pay-out is also 
selected through the draw of a numbered chip from another bingo cage (Cage 2) that contains 
as many numbered chips as the number of questions that the respondent answered during the 
experiment. The drawn participant wins the additional 100€ if and only if the event she/he had 
chosen in the drawn question contains the value of the random variable under consideration 
that the best science currently predicts. This prediction is based on the research conducted by 
the Edmund Mach Foundation (EMF). This procedure for determination of a “win” in the 
lottery situation is similar to that used by Fiore et al. (2009) in their virtual experiment on the 
risk of wild fires. Despite some participants already being aware of the existence of the EMF, 
all subjects are provided with general information about the research that EMF has done that 
provides that science-based estimate of probabilities. Note that even when all subjects receive 
the same risk information, it is a common finding that they may not form the same subjective 
estimates (e.g. Riddel and Shaw 2006; Shaw et al. forthcoming). In all treatments subjects 
were provided with precise information about the values that the random variables under study 
had in the last ten years (from 2000 to 2010) and then they were asked to play the games.  
In the C treatments subjects are asked to answer questions that allow us to elicit the 
percentiles of their CDFs in the following order: g1/2, g1/4, g3/4, a1/2, a1/4, a3/4, r1/2, r1/4, and r3/4. 
In the U treatments, this chained structure of the game is hidden through a mixed up order of 
questions determined once and for all. In fact, we elicit the percentiles of respondents’ CDFs 
in the following order: g1/2, a1/2, r1/2, g1/4, a1/4, r1/4, g3/4, a3/4, and r3/4. 
It follows that each respondent, regardless of the treatment group to which she/he is 
randomly  assigned,  plays  exchangeability  games  and  lotteries  three  times,  one  for  each 
random variables under study.  
6  Hypotheses 
Given the theoretical background of the EM, all definitions, axioms and theorems of 
probability  theory  are  satisfied  under  the  exchangeability  assumption.  Considering  two 
disjoint sub-events, 
i
j G  and 
k
j G , this assumption is satisfied when the two sub-events are 12
exchangeable in the sense that the probability related to the occurrence of one must be equal to 
the probability of occurrence of the other (see Appendix B). When the assumption holds we 
fail to reject the following null hypothesis (H0): 
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We test this first assumption, and thus the validity of stated risk estimates elicited via 
the EM by investigating whether respondents’ choice behaviours are consistent across the EG, 
the REG, and CEG. In particular, we test two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. We test whether the exchangeability assumption is satisfied or not by 
comparing the estimates of g1/2 obtained from the EG and the estimates of g1/2’ obtained from 
repeated version of the game (REG). The exchangeability assumption is satisfied if and only if 
we fail to reject the following null hypothesis (H0): 
H0: g1/2 = g1/2’
H1: g1/2 ￿ g1/2’ 
Hypothesis 2. We test whether the exchangeability assumption is satisfied or not by 
comparing  the  certainty  equivalents  that  respondents  are  willing  to  accept  to  give  up  the 
possibility to play the lotteries presented in the matched pairs of choice tasks,  ( ) [ ]
i
j G x L :  in 
CT1 and  ( ) [ ]
k
j G x L :  in CT2. The exchangeability assumption is satisfied if and only if we fail 
to reject the following null hypotheses (H0): 




j G x L CE G x L CE : : = , with k ￿ i, k ￿ j 




j G x L CE G x L CE : : ≠
7  Testing hypotheses 
Before  testing  these  hypotheses,  we  check  the  consistency  of  subjects’  choice 
behaviours by examining their answers to the repeated binary questions presented at the end of 13
the Exchangeability Game. The McNemar test shows that subjects’ choices are stable across 
treatments
13.  
Now,  testing  our  hypotheses  at  sample  level,  we  examine  the  role  of  monetary 
incentives  and  chained questions in  affecting  the  validity  of  stated  risk  estimates  and  we 
identify the experimental design providing the highest percentage of valid risk measures. We 
determine whether respondents belonging to diverse experimental treatments provide valid 
risk estimates or not. Recall that respondents provide valid stated risk estimates if and only if 
we fail to reject the null hypotheses presented in Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
We  test  Hypotheses  1  and  2  by  using  nonparametric  tests  such  as  the  Wilcoxon 
Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks test (WMP) and the Sign Test of Matched Pairs (SMP). The 
SMP test is used because of the possibility that the assumptions behind the WMP test are not 
always satisfied  in our  sample.  For  example,  the  differences  between  the  matched  values 
provided by each subject are not always distributed symmetrically around the median point in 
our sub-samples (this is the symmetry assumption). 
Testing Hypothesis 1, we only investigates the validity of median risk measures (g1/2, 
a1/2, and r1/2) elicited via the EG and REG. Testing Hypothesis 2, we also examine the validity 
of quartile risk estimates since this hypothesis relates to observations of median and quartile 
values of individual CDFs (g1/2, a1/2, r1/2, g1/4, a1/4, r1/4, g3/4, a3/4,and r3/4) elicited via the EG 
and CEG. 
Further,  we  assess  the  validity  rate  (V)  for  each  different  experimental  treatment, 
where V is the percentage of respondents in each group providing valid risk estimates. In this 
case, we need to verify whether each observation (g1/2, a1/2, r1/2, g1/4, a1/4, r1/4, g3/4, a3/4, and
r3/4) provided by each respondent (i = 1, 80) is valid or not. For example, let’s consider one 
specific experimental subject who provides us with the estimate of g1/2. We assume that this 




2 : : G x L CE G x L CE = . This does not imply any 
statistical  test,  but  just  a  simple  check  of  the  equality  between  ( ) [ ]
1
2 :G x L CE
and ( ) [ ]
2
2 :G x L CE . 
Finally, since we hypothesize that not only the features of the experimental setting 
may determine the validity of respondents’ stated risk estimates, but also their socio-economic 
                                                          
13 Results are available from the corrisponding author under request. 14
conditions,  we  econometrically  test  this  hypothesis  by  estimating  a  model  in  which  the 
discrete  dependent  variable  captures  the  validity  of  each  observation  provided  by  each 
respondent.  A  set  of  explanatory  dummy  variables  captures  the  characteristics  of  each 
experimental setting in terms of chaining and monetary incentives, and other socio-economic 
variables characterizing the subjects, allowing for some observable heterogeneity.  
8  Results 
8.1  Non-parametric tests 
By testing Hypothesis 1 for each experimental group of respondents, we identify the 
effect of our experimental designs on respondents’ capability to provide valid estimates of the 
median values. In the TRC we have 24 matched pairs of observations; in the TRU 40; in the 
THC 22; and in the THU 26 (Table 1).  
The validity of median estimates of individual CDFs (g1/2, a1/2, and r1/2) is determined 
by testing Hypothesis 1 via both the WMP and the SMP tests. Median estimates are assumed 
to be valid if and only if we fail to reject the null hypothesis characterizing this test. Based on 
the WMP test, TRU and THU groups provide valid stated risk estimates, while TRC and THC 
do not, however the validity of WMP test about the THC group may be compromised because 
all assumptions behind the test are not completely satisfied. The SMP test almost produces the 
same results except for the fact that also THC group provides valid estimates (Table 2). The 
discrepancy  between  WMP  and  SMP  results  about  the  THC  group  suggest  that  the 
interpretation of these results is problematic, and thus, we conclude that only TRU and THU 
groups provide valid risk estimates. 
Testing  Hypothesis  2  for  each  experimental  group  of  respondents  allows  us  to 
investigate whether respondents belonging to diverse experimental treatments provide valid 
risk estimates of the median and quartile values of individual CDFs or not. In the TRC we 
have 143 matched pairs of observations; in the TRU 167; in the THC 136; and in the THU 
115 (Table 3). Again, the validity of median, first quartile, and second quartile estimates of 
individual  CDFs  (g1/2, a1/2,  r1/2,  g1/4, a1/4,  r1/4, g3/4, a3/4,  and  r3/4)  is  determined  by testing 
Hypothesis 2 via both the WMP and the SMP tests. Estimates are assumed to be valid if and 
only we fail to reject the null hypothesis characterizing this test. The WMP test shows that the 15
TRC and the THU groups do not provide valid risk estimates, while the TRU and the THC do. 
However, the SMP test suggests that also the THC do not provide valid risk estimates, and 
thus the TRU is the only group providing valid risk measures (Table 4). Again, dissimilar 
results obtained by the WMP and SMP tests do not allow us to express reliable findings about 
the validity of risk estimates obtained from the THC group. Hence, we conclude that the only 
group providing valid estimates is the TRU.  
8.2  The validity rate and the econometric analysis
For each treatment, we calculate the validity rate (V) which is simply the percentage of 
valid risk estimates within each treatment group. According to the previous findings, we found 
that TRU provides the highest validity rate (39.13%), then the THU (29.86%), TRC (26.26%), 
and THC (21.64) follow. Comparing the validity rates of THU (29.86%) and TRC (26.26%), 
we conclude that the usage of chained experimental design totally undoes the beneficial effect 
of using real monetary incentives (Table 5). 
Further, we hypothesize that not only experimental designs, but also socio-economics 
characteristics  of  respondents  and  their  degree  of  familiarity  with  the  problem  influence 
individual performances in terms of validity. This hypothesis is econometrically tested by 
estimating diverse discrete  models  in  which  the  dependent variable VALID  represents  the 
validity of each risk estimates provided by each respondents. The dependent variable takes the 




j G x L CE G x L CE : : = , 
with k ￿ i, k ￿ j.  
The probability that the risk estimate is valid depends on a set of explanatory variables 
available from survey-type questions given in the laboratory, the experimental treatment that 
respondents  belong  to,  the  socio-economics  status  of  respondents  themselves,  and 
respondents’ degree of interest in the issue of food security (see Table 6 for details about the 
explanatory variables).  
Given that each respondent i provides 9 risk estimates (g1/2, a1/2, r1/2, g1/4, a1/4, r1/4, g3/4, 
a3/4,  and  r3/4),  we  should  have  a  panel data  of  720  observations.  However,  we  have  142 
missing values for the dependent variable VALID because the game investigating the validity 16
of risk estimates was not always displayed to respondents depending on the choices they made 
during the experiment. 
We estimate five diverse models (Model 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) by using the generalized 
linear model estimation with and without robust standard errors. Hereafter, we focus on the 
estimation with robust standard errors that allows for clustering effects. 
In Model 1, the probability  of  providing  valid risk  estimates only  depends on  the 
features of the experimental treatment respondents belong to. The influence of real monetary 
incentives and chained questions is captured by the following set of dummy variables (T), 
TRC, TRU, THC, and THU. Each dummy takes the value 1 if and only if the respondents 
belong to the treatment that the variable represents. The THC is used as baseline. 
Model 1 VALIDi  = ￿0 + ￿1Ti 
We observe that respondents who belong to the TRC, TRU, and THU have higher 
probability of providing valid risk estimates than respondents who belong to the THC (Table 
8). However, this result is statistically significant only for the TRU dummy variable. 
In Model 2, we also include two sets of dummy variables. The first (RV) captures 
whether  the  probability  of  providing  valid  risk  estimates  depends  on  the  variable  that 
respondents have to consider in playing the EG, the percentage (or number) of days in which 
the infestation will occur during the blossoming period in 2030 (G), the number of apples 
containing at least one residue in a sample of 100 apples in 2030 (A), and the number of 
apples containing more than one residue in a sample of 100 apples in 2030 (R). G is used as 
baseline.  The  second  (P)  aims  to  capture  whether  the  validity  of  stated  risk  estimates  is 
statistically different among median estimates (g1/2, a1/2, and r1/2), first-quartile estimates (g1/4, 
a1/4, and r1/4), and second-quartile estimates (g3/4, a3/4, and r3/4), where the latter is the baseline 
(Table 8). 
Model 2 VALIDi  = ￿0 + ￿1Ti + ￿2RVi +￿3Pi
We found no statistical difference in terms of validity between risk estimates related to 
diverse variables and diverse percentiles.  17
In  Model  3,  we  also  investigate  the  effects  of  socio-economic  variable  (S)  on  the 
probability that respondents provide valid risk estimates. We take our cues from extensive 
psychological  research  on  the  role  that  several  factors  can  play  in  the  determination  of 
perceived  risk.  The  variables  under  study  are  age  (AGE),  gender  (FEMALE),  education 
(SECONDARY,  HIGH_SCHOOL,  and  UNIVERSITY),  and  the  type  of  education 
(SCIENTIFIC) (Table 8).  
Model 3 VALIDi  = ￿0 + ￿1Ti + ￿2RVi +￿3Pi + ￿4Si 
We  expected  that  the  probability  of  providing  valid  risk  estimates  would possibly 
increase for high educated and younger respondents, but we found that older respondents’ 
estimates are more likely to be valid than the others and that education does not affect the 
validity of individual risk estimates (Table 8).  
In Model 4, we consider also the interest of respondents on apples and food security by 
including  in  the  model  a  set  of  dummy  variable  (I)  such  as  being  an  apple  farmer 
(PRODUCER),  being  an  apple  consumer  (CONSUMER),  being  a  member  of  a  consumer 
association (CONS_ASS), and being resident in the Province of Trento (TRENTINO).  
Model 4 VALIDi  = ￿0 + ￿1Ti + ￿2RVi + ￿3Pi + ￿4Si + ￿5Ii  
Although we expected to observe that people who reside in the Province of Trento and 
consume and/or produce apples perform better than the others in terms of valid risk estimates, 
perhaps  because  they  are  more  interested  in  the  topic,  our  empirical  results  suggest  no 
significant explanatory effects for these variables (Table 8).  
In  Model  5,  we  add  another  set  of  dummy  variables  (T)  which  capture  whether 
subjects  trust  the  predictions  of  IPCC  about  temperature  and  precipitation  in  2030 
(IPCC_TRUST),  the  predictions  of  EMF  about  the  fire  blight’s  infestation  risk  in  2030 
(EMF_TRUST),  and  our  statement  that  apple  farmers  will  continue  to  use  the  chemical 
control against apple disease in the future (SCENARIO_TRUST). 
Model 5 VALIDi = ￿0 + ￿1Ti + ￿2RVi + ￿3Pi + ￿4Si + ￿5Ii + ￿5Ti  18
In this case, we predict that subjects who trust the information we gave them during 
the experimental instructions more likely provide valid risk estimates, as we suppose that the 
truster plays the game more carefully. Despite our predictions are confirmed overall, we found 
the  trust  in  EMF’s  predictions  reduces  the  probability  of  providing  valid  risk  estimates. 
However, the estimation of Model 2, 3, 4, and 5 provides us with results about the effect of 
our experimental designs that are very similar to those obtained by the estimation of Model 1.  
The consistency of our econometric results with those obtained from non-parametric 
tests suggests that real monetary incentives increase the validity of stated risk estimates and 
that chained  questions have  the  opposite effect. Moreover, we  found that socio-economic 
variables  and  the  interest  of  respondents  in  the  topic  do  not  influence  the  likelihood  of 
providing valid risk estimates. Only the age of respondents affects their ability to state valid 
estimates.  
9  Conclusions 
The paper has considered the influence of real monetary incentives and chained ordering 
of questions on risk elicitation. Based on median risk estimates, our statistical analysis shows 
that unchained treatments provide valid risk estimates, while chained do not. This finding 
suggests that the chained questions undermine the incentive compatibility of the game even 
when respondents are provided with real monetary incentives (Baillon, 2008; Abdellaoui et 
al., 2011). 
Furthermore, when a treatment group is presented with a design with sorted questions, 
so that the chained structure is hidden, these subjects provide valid risk estimated even when 
they are not paid based on their performances. This supports Baillon’s (2008) contention that 
regardless of being given actual monetary incentives or not, respondents play the games by 
just telling the truth about their beliefs. A caveat is that this result only takes subjects’ median 
risk estimates in account, without considering observations related to the first and second 
quartiles.   
Considering the whole set of stated risk estimates and not just the median estimates, we 
found that the only treatment group providing valid estimates received real money payments 19
and unchained questions. When more of the distribution is being considered, real monetary 
incentives  strongly  affect  respondents’  performances  in  terms  of  validity.  However,  the 
beneficial effect of real monetary incentives on the validity of stated risk estimates is negated 
when subjects are presented with the experimental design of the game clearly chained. This 
finding is confirmed by our measures of the validity rate (V). The percentage of valid risk 
estimates is almost 40% when subjects are presented with real monetary incentives and the 
experimental  design  where  the  chaining  is  hidden.  The  validity  rate  falls  to  26%  with 
hypothetical monetary incentives and the experimental design where the chaining is clear and 
to 29%  with  real  monetary  incentives  and  the  experimental  design  where  the  chaining  is 
hidden.  
Those interested in using this risk elicitation methodology can thus walk away with two 
important messages here. First, subjects are indeed more likely to provide valid risk estimates 
over more of an entire distribution (than one measure of central tendency) if they are rewarded 
with real monetary incentives based on their performances and if they are presented with 
experimental design where the chaining is hidden through a particular randomization of the 
questions. Second, and more disappointing perhaps, is that only a relatively small portion of 
stated risk estimates (40%) can be considered valid under the definition we have applied here, 
which relates to behavioral axioms. The latter implication may be of little surprise to skeptics, 
but is relevant in our goal to continue to improve ways to provide reliable information about 
people’s risk perceptions and subjective probabilities. 
Further researches on the validity of stated risk estimates elicited via the exchangeability 
method might address these issues at the individual level. Instead of investigating the validity 
of each single observation, one might investigate the ability of each subject in providing valid 
risk  estimates.  This  would  be  possible  by  collecting,  for  each  subject,  a  number  of 
observations large enough to test the validity of her/his stated risks by using non-parametric 
tests. 20
Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Summary statistics of median values obtained via EG (X1/2) and REG (X1/2’) 
Treatment  Variable  Obs  Mean  St.Dev.  Min  Max 
X1/2  24  44.37  27.69  7  94  Real incentives-Chained 
questions  X1/2’  24  44.96  27.87  7  94 
X1/2  40  44.05  26.17  2  96  Real incentives- 
Unchained questions  X1/2’  40  44.17  25.98  3  96 
X1/2  22  54.91  28.03  5  94  Hypothetical incentives- 
Chained questions  X1/2’  22  55.91  28.08  7  94 
X1/2  26  40.35  28.74  3  94  Hypothetical incentives- 
Unchained questions  X1/2’  26  40.65  28.27  3  96 



















Median(X1/2) =  




Median(X1/2) =  
Median(X1/2’)  -1.174  0.2668 
*1% significance level 
**5% significance level 
***10% significance level 21

























Median(CEL2) -3.005*  0.0000 
*1% significance level 
**5% significance level 
***10% significant level 
Table 3. Summary statistics of the Certainty Equivalents obtained via CEG 
Treatment  Variable  Obs  Mean  St.Dev.  Min  Max 
CEL1  143  51.21  46.38  0  125  Real incentives- 
Chained questions  CEL2 143  76.95  44.69  0  125 
CEL1 167  59.80  42.31  0  125  Real incentives- 
Unchained questions  CEL2 167  68.22  41.72  0  125 
CEL1 136  70.80  43.30  0  125  Hypothetical incentives- 
Chained questions  CEL2 136  75.86  42.14  0  125 
CEL1 115  55.65  36.14  0  125  Hypothetical incentives- 
Unchained questions  CEL1 115  73.17  37.11  0  125 22
Table 5. Validity rates (V) for all treatments  
Treatment  Number of 
observations 
Number of valid observations  V (%) 
Real-Chained  192  52  26.26 
Real-Unchained  207  81  39.13 
Hypothetical-Chained  171  37  21.64 
Hypothetical-Unchained  144  43  29.86 
Table 6a. Description of dependent and independent variables of Model 1, 2, 3 and 4 
Variable  Definition  Mean  St.Dev.  Min  Max 
VALID  = 1 if valid, = 0 otherwise  .368  .482  0  1 
TRC  = 1 if “Real Incentives-Chained 
Questions” treatment, 
= 0 otherwise 
.275  .446  0  1 
TRU  = 1 if “Real Incentives-Unchained 
Questions” treatment, 
= 0 otherwise 
.287  .452  0  1 
THC  = 1 if “Hypo Incentives-Chained 
Questions” treatment, 
= 0 otherwise 
.237  .425  0  1 
THU  = 1 if “Hypo Incentives-
Unchained Questions” treatment, 
= 0 otherwise 
.200  .400  0  1 
G  Number of days when the 
infestation risk is extremely high 
in April 
.333  .471  0  1 
A  Number of apples containing at 
least one pesticide residue 
.333  .471  0  1 
R  Number of apples containing 
multiple pesticide residue 
.333  .471  0  1 
50
th PERC.  Observations related to the 
median of G, A, and R  
.333  .471  0  1 
25
th PERC.  Observations related to the I 
quartile of G, A, and R  
.334  .471  0  1 
75
th PERC.  Observations related to the II 
quartile of G, A, and R  
.333  .471  0  1 23
Table 6b. Description of dependent and independent variables of Model 1,2, 3 and 4
Variable  Definition  Mean  St.Dev.  Min  Max 
CONSUMER  = 1 if the respondent eats at least 
3 apples a week 
= 0 otherwise 
.478  .500  0  1 
CONS_ASS  = 1 if the respondent is a member 
of a consumer association 
= 0 otherwise 
.062  .242  0  1 
PRODUCER  = 1 if the respondent produces 
apples 
= 0 otherwise 
.037  .190  0  1 
TRENTINO  = 1 if the respondent resides in 
the province of Trento 
= 0 otherwise 
.737  .440  0  1 
IPCC_TRUST  Trust in IPCC’s predictions of the 
future temperature and 
precipitation (at 5 levels)
a 
2.950  .545  0  4 
EMF_TRUST  Trust in EMF’s predictions of fire 
blight’s infestation risk in the 
future (at 5 levels)
a
2.587  .684  0  4 
SCENARIO_ 
TRUST 
Agreement with the fact that 
farmers will use the chemical 
control in the future (at 5 levels)
b
2.912  .778  0  4 
AGE  Age in years  32.746  12.578  19  68 
FEMALE  = 1 if female,  
= 0 otherwise 
.4366  .4994  0  1 
SECONDARY_ 
SCHOOL 
= 1 if the respondent have this 
education level, 
= 0 otherwise 
.1830  .3895  0  1 
HIGH_SCHOOL  = 1 if the respondent have this 
education level, 
= 0 otherwise 
.5070  .5035  0  1 
UNIVERSITY  = 1 if the respondent have this 
education level, 
= 0 otherwise 
.3098  .4657  0  1 
SCIENTIFIC  = 1 if the respondent have a 
scientific education 
= 0 otherwise 
.487  .500  0  1 
a From 0= very high trust to 4= very low trust 
b From 0=strongly disagree to 4= strongly agree 24
Table 7. Generalized Linear Model Estimation of Models 1,2, 3, and 4 
Dependent Variable: VALID
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  
TRC  .218***  .220***  .251***  .382***  .370*** 
TRU  .520***  .505***  .545***  .575***  .648***
THU  .251***  .238***  .278***  .319***  .385*** 
A  - -.052***  -.036***  -.045***  -.058***
R  - -.131***  -.130***  -.143***  -.173***
MEDIAN  - -.085***  -.088***  -.090***  -.077***
25
th PERC  - -.124***  -.109***  -.110***  -.094***
FEMALE  -  -  -.131***  -.126***  -.097***
AGE  -  -  .015***  .013***  .019***
SEC_SCHOOL  -  -  -.185***  -.179***  -.086*** 
HIGH_SCHOOL  -  -  -.055***  -.037***  -.016***
SCIENTIFIC  - - -.009***  .084***  .173***
PRODUCER  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ .595*** .584*** 
CONSUMER  -  -  -  -.025***  -.021***
CONS_ASS  - - - .184***  .312*** 
TRENTINO  -  -  -  .273***  .067*** 
IPCC_TRUST  - - -  -  .359*** 
EMF_TRUST  - - - - -.355*** 
SCEN_TRUST  - - -  -  .253*** 
CONSTANT  -.606***  -.468***  -.901***  -1.086***  -2.160*** 
LOG L.HOOD -374.018**  -373.110**  -365.030**  -359.370**  -347.702** 
*1% significance level 
**5% significance level 
***10% significance level 25
Table 8. Generalized Linear Model Estimation of Models 1,2, 3, and 4 with robust 
standard errors and clustering effects  
Dependent Variable: VALID










TRC  .218***  .220***  .251***  .382***  .370*** 
TRU  .520***  .505*** .545***  .575***  .648***
THU  .251***  .238***  .278***  .319***  .385*** 
A  -  -.052***  -.036***  -.045***  -.058***
R  -  -.131***  -.130***  -.143***  -.173***
MEDIAN  -  -.085***  -.088***  -.090***  -.077***
25
th PERC  -  -.124***  -.109***  -.110***  -.094***
FEMALE  -  -  -.131***  -.126***  -.097***
AGE  -  -  .015***  .013***  .019*** 
SEC_SCHOOL  -  -  -.185***  -.179***  -.086*** 
HIGH_SCHOOL  -  -  -.055***  -.037***  -.016***
SCIENTIFIC  -  -  -.009***  .084***  .173***
PRODUCER  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ .595***  .584***
CONSUMER  -  -  -  -.025***  -.021*** 
CONS_ASS  -  -  -  .184***  .312*** 
TRENTINO  -  -  -  .273***  .067*** 
IPCC_TRUST  -  -  -  -  .359***
EMF_TRUST  -  -  -  -  -.355*** 
SCEN_TRUST  -  -  -  -  .253***
CONSTANT  -.606***  -.468***  -.901***  -1.086***  -2.160*** 
LOG L.HOOD -374.018**  -373.110**  -365.030**  -359.370**  -347.702** 
*1% significance level 
**5% significance level 
***10% significance level 26
Figure 1: Structure of the experimental design27
Appendix A: Games’ Examples 
Example 1. First question of the Exchangeability Game for the variable g
I prefer to bet 100€ on the fact that the number of days of April in which the fire blight 
infestation will occur with certainty in 2030 is: 
Example 2. First question of the Repeated 
Exchangeability Game Test for the variable g1/2’
I prefer to bet 100€ on the fact that the number of days of April in which the fire blight 
infestation will occur with certainty in 2030 is: 
￿ ￿
smaller than ga
a  greater than or equal to ga
a
a ga={g0 + [(g1-g0)/2]}
￿ ￿
greater than g1/4 
and  
smaller than g1/2
greater than or equal to g1/2 
and 
smaller than g3/428
Example 3. One question from the Certainty Equivalent Game for g1/2
In each of the following question, do you prefer to play the lottery presented in Option A or do 
you prefer to take the amount of money presented in Option B? 
Option A Option B 
￿ ￿  0€ 
￿ ￿  25€ 
￿ ￿  49€ 
￿ ￿  51€ 
￿ ￿  75€ 
You win 100€ if the number of days of April 
in which the fire blight infestation will occur 
with certainty in 2030 is SMALLER THAN 
g1/2
0€, otherwise 
￿ ￿  100€ 
In each of the following question, do you prefer to play the lottery presented in Option A or do 
you prefer to take the amount of money presented in Option B? 
Option A Option B 
￿ ￿  0€ 
￿ ￿  25€ 
￿ ￿  49€ 
￿ ￿  51€ 
￿ ￿  75€ 
You win 100€  if the number of days of April 
in which the fire blight infestation will occur 
with certainty in 2030 is GREATER THAN 
or EQUAL TO g1/2
0€, otherwise 
￿ ￿  100€ 29
Appendix B 
Definition, axioms and theorems of the probability theory 
Let 
i
j G  be disjoint events with i = {1, .., n} and j = n and SG be a sample space, then:  
Statement 1 ( ) 1 = G S P           
Consider the sample space SG, we impose that SG =
1
1 G = 1 by telling respondents that 
the probability associated to the entire sample space is equal to 1, say SG =
1
1 G = 1.             





2 G P   and  ( )
2
2 G P ,  we  impose  that  ( ) 0
1
2 ≥ G P   and  ( ) 0
2
2 ≥ G P   by  asking 
respondents to the lower (g0) and upper (g1) bounds of the event space outside of which they 
are essentially certain the outcome cannot happen at all. This is basically the first question of 
Exchangeability Game. 
Statement 3 If { }
i
j G  is a sequence of disjoint sets in SG, then  
Consider ( )
1
2 G P  and  ( )
2
2 G P , “exchangeability” assumption imposes that 




j G P G P − =1     
Consider ( )
1
2 G P  and  ( )
2
2 G P , “exchangeability” assumption imposes that 
Statement 5 ( ) 0 = φ P
















j G P G P
1 1 ￿
















G P G P G G P ￿
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Statement 6 For each  , G
i
j S G ∈  then  ( ) 1 0 ≤ ≤
i
j G P   
See Statements 1 and 2. 













2 G , “exchangeability” assumption imposes that  
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￿￿￿￿￿&￿ #￿￿￿ ￿!￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿'￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿(￿ #￿￿￿ #%￿￿ #￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ &￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ &￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ '￿"￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿%￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿







￿￿￿￿￿3￿ )￿￿￿"￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ #￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿￿%￿￿ ￿￿￿ -￿￿ ￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿)￿￿￿￿",￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
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￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ )￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿/,￿ '￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
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